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Abstract _ 
. In this paper we study interactions between labor and product markets, in an imperfectly 
competitive industry with centralized wage bargaining. Firms joint1y bargain with the union over 
wages and then compete in prices or quantities. We show that the negotiated wage is independent 
of the number of firms, the degree of substitutability of firms' products, and the type of market 
competition, in a broad c1ass of industry specifications, including the standard syrnmetric linear 
demand system-linear one factor (labor) technology. This result is robust to various union 
objectives. Thus, unions are better-off as the market becomes more competitive because aggregate ! 
employment increases. Finally,. motivated by the wage independence property, we propose that 
the bargained wage in a Bertrand homogenous market be taken as the limit of that of a 
differentiated market as the degree of substitutability goes to one. 
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1 Introduction: 
Unions are fundamental1y organizations that seek to create or 
capture monopoly rents available in an industry. These rents 
could come from product market imperfections or from regulation 
of the industry. 
Ashenfelter,O. and Layard, R. (Handbook of Labor Economics, 
1986) 
Most of the existing literature on col1ective bargaining focuses on the im­
pact of unionization of the labor market on different variables of economic 
performance, such as profitability, employment, wage structure, productivity 
etc. An important issue they address is how different bargaining institutions 
affect these variables in various countries or industries within a country. In 
these studies the product market structure is typical1y assumed to be fixed. 
A complementary issue arising in this context is how product market param­
eters, such as industry concentration, the degree of product differentiation 
and the type of market competition, affect the negotiated wage, employment 
and other variables of economic performance. In this paper we develop a 
theoretical model to analyze the effects of the product market specification 
on negotiated wages. \Ve restrict attention to the case of industry-wide cen­
tralized bargaining. 
In the empirical literature there is evidence of substantial wage differen­
tials among industries that appear to be stable oVer time (Krueger & Sum­
mers (1988)). Layard et al. (1991) attribute these differentials mainly to 
firm specific factors (such as the size of firms in the industry, their produc­
tivity and profitability). These factors do not seem to be of less importance 
when bargaining is centralized or when product markets are more competi­
. tive. Dickens & Katz (1987) detect sorne link between wages and industry 
concentration, which however is not robust to the inclusion of controls for 
labor quality. Rose (1987) reports that deregulation of the US trucking in­
dustry was accompanied by a significant reduction of wage differentials. On 
the other hand, deregulation of the airline industry in the US did not appear 
to be accompanied by significant wage reduetions (Card (1989)). Further, 
Hirsch & Connol1y (1987), and Hirsch (1990) find no evidence that union 
rent seeking is more effective in highly concentrated industries or among 
firms with large market share. Lewis (1986) provides evidence that union 
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wage premiums are typically smaller in highly concentrated industries. The 
evidence as it stands seems therefore to be rather inconclusive on the link 
between product market specification and wages. vVe intend, as a first step, 
to explore this link by means of a theoretical model. 
In particular, this paper analyzes interactions between labor and product 
markets, in an n-firm oligopolistic industry with centralized wage bargaining. 
In the first stage firms joint1y bargain with the union over wages, thereafter 
each firm chooses its employment level (Right-to-Manage). Finally, firms 
compete in prices, or quantities, in the product market. Firms are endowed 
with identical one factor (labor) technologies. The union's objective function 
depends both on wages and aggregate employment, and is assumed to be 
log-linear in employment. This subsumes a large class of union objectives 
used in the literature1 . A specific type of differentiated industry with linear 
demands is introduced to capture the effects of product substitutability on 
the negotiated wage. We employ the Generalized Nash Bargaining solution 
to obtain the negotiated wage, assuming that the firms and the union take 
into account the consequences of their decision for employrnent and product 
market competition. 
There is a popular conception of unions as entities that attempt to ex­
tract rents from firms2 • If this view were correct, one would expect to see 
higher wages, ceteris paribus, when markets are "more" imperfect (e.g. if 
the number of firms is smaller, or firms' products are poorer substitutes). 
Is this in fact true? vVe show that, contrary to this belief, the negotiated 
wage is independent of the number of firms, the degree of substitutability 
of firms' products, and the type of market competition, in a broad class 
of industry specifications, including the standard linear symmetric demand 
system - linear one factor technology one. These results are robust with re­
spect to various specifications of union's objectives. This independence of 
the negotiated wage implies that increases in the intensity of competition are 
refiected only in increases in aggregate industry employrnent. In a related 
work, Ulph & Ulph (1989) illustrate situations where the negotiated wage is 
independent of the product price. As a result, sectorial shifts in demand and 
labor productivity are entirely absorbed by employment adjustments. 
1See section 4. 
2E.g. see quote at the beginning of the introduction. See also Layard, R., Nickell, S., 
and Jackman, R.(1991) page 189. 
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It is well-known that the negotiated wage in a homogenous Bertrand 
market with constant returns to scale is indeterminate. The Nash product 
is not well defined in this case, since firms' profits are zero for any wage. 
Motivated by the aboye wage independence property, we propose that the 
negotiated wage in a Bertrand homogenous market be taken as the limit of 
that of a differentiated market as the degree of substitutability goes to one. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model 
and provides the conditions under which the wage independence property 
holds. Section 3 shows that these conditions are satisfied in a linear sym­
metric demands-linear one factor (labor) industry. Section 4 discusses the 
robustness of these results to different union objectives and provides an ex­
ample to show the necessity of our assumptions. In section 5 we propose 
a solution for the Bertrand homogenous goods market. Finally, Section 6 
coneludes. 
2 The Model: 
There are n firms, all of which have identical log-linear one factor (labor) 
technologies: 
i=l, ..... ,n (1) 
A> 0, B ~ 1 
where Xi is firm i's output and li is the labor used by firm i. The n firms 
and the union collectively bargain over the wage w, following which each firm 
chooses its employrnent level, li (Right-to-Manage, Nickell (1982)). Finally, 
firms compete in the product market. The nature of market competition is 
not specified at this stage. Firms can compete by choosing only quantities, 
or prices, (as is assumed in the next section), or their strategy space may 
inelude other variables, too. 
The union's objective is to maximize a functíon of the wage, w, and the 
aggregate employment, L: 
U(w, L) = u(w).U (2) 
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where r E lR+ measures the relative importance given to employment, and 
u(.) is an increasing concave function of the wage. This objective stems from 
a large variety of union welfare functions used in the literature after taking 
account of its outside option (see Section 4). 
The negotiated wage is obtained with the use of the generalized Nash 
Bargaining solution where a parameter b, O~ b ~ 1, represents the exoge­
nously given bargaining power of the union. In the limit as b = 1, the union 
unilateraHy sets the wage, while if b = Ofirms set the wage. Let TI* (w; K) 
represent the firms' aggregate "indirect" profits, and L*(w; K) the aggre­
gate employment level, for a given negotiated wage, w, with K being a list 
of parameters characterizing the market. A generalized Nash bargain then 
solves: 
Max.w[U(w, L*(w; KW[TI*(w; K)F-b 
Restricting attention to symmetric market equilibria, we have that TI* (w; K) = 
mr*(w; K), and L*(w; K) = nZ*(w; K), where 7r*(w; K), and Z*(w; K), are a 
firm's equilibrium profits, and employment, respectively. Log-linear technol­
ogy (1) then implies that Z*(w; K) = (x*(w; K))B lA, where x*(w; K) lS a 
firm' s output in equilibrium. 
Given (2), the negotiated wage is determined according to: 
(3)
 
A prIOrI, we could expect the wage emerging from this maximization
 
exercise to depend on aH the factors afi'ecting the union's welfare or the firms'
 
profits. In particular, it is interesting to ask whether an increase in industry
 
concentration, or in the firms' market power willlead to a higher negotiated
 
wage. In view of. the prevailing interest in the problem of unemployment,
 
this question may have an even greater significance for employment policy.
 
The following proposition gives the conditions under which the negotiated 
wage is independent of a list of market parameters . 
Proposition 1: The Independence Property: 
Let there be n identicaZ firms, each with log-linear one factor (labor) tech­
nology, bargaining with a single union. Jf a firm 's equilibrium output and 
"indirect" profit functions 3 are multiplicatively separable (m-separable) in 
3\Ve make the standard assumptions to ensure that these functions are differentiable. 
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wages and a list of parameters K, and if the union's objective function is 
m-separable in wages and in employment and is log-linear in employment, 
then the negotiated wage emerging fmm centralized bargaining is independent 
of the list of parameters K, and the number of firms, n. 
Proof: Let a firm's equilibrium output and "indirect" profit funetions 
be represented as: 
x*(W; K) = 1jJ(w)q;(K) (4) 
7r*(w; K) = 'lJ(w).<l>(K) (5) 
Note, that (3) is equivalent to 
Max b [In u(w) + r In n +rB lnx*(w; K) - r In A]+(l-b) [In n + In 7r*(w; K)]
w 
Substituting for 7r*(w; K) and x*(w; K), and taking the first order condition 
(assuming the second order condition is satisfied), we get: 
b.u'(w) + Bbr1jJ'(w). + (1 - b).'lJ'(w) = O (6) 
u(w) 1jJ(w) 'lJ(w) 
Clearly, therefore, the solution of this equation for w does not depend on 
K or on n.. 
\> 
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The Generalized Nash bar­
gaining solution requires that the negotiated wage be such that the percent­
age decrease in the firms' "indirect" profits due to a wage increase, weighted 
by the firms' bargaining power, is equal to the percentage increase in union's 
welfare, weighted by its bargaining power . Given the form of union's objec­
tive (2), the latter can be decomposed into the percentage increase of wage­
related welfare, u(w), and the percentage decrease of employment-related 
welfare, Lr. Clearly, the percentage increase of wage-related union welfare is 
independent of the number of firms and the list of parameters, K. On the 
other hand, our separability assumption ensures that the percentage decrease 
in aggregate profits, n7r*(wj K), and the percentage decrease of employment­
related union's welfare, (nl*(wj K)Y = (n[x*(wj K)]B / AY, are also indepen­
dent of n and K. This in turn implies that the negotiated wage does not 
depend on the number of firms, n, or the list of parameters, K. 
5 
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A natural question that arises is what types of industries (or econornies) 
would satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1 and what are the parameters 
included in the list K. In the next section we show that syrnmetric lin­
ear demands-linear one factor technology economies where firms compete 
in prices, or in quantities, in the product market is an interesting class of 
economies that do satisfy those conditions. 
Linear Demand-Linear Technology
 
Economies
 
Interestingly, it turns out that a class of industry (or economy) specifications 
that is used extensively in the literature does in fact satisfy the conditions of 
Proposition 1. In addition, we show that in these economies, the negotiated 
wage is independent of the type oi competition, too. Let us now describe the 
specific features of these economies. 
As before, there are n identical firms in the market, each endowed with a 
linear one factor (labor) technology which is given by (1) with B = 1. Firms 
face a symmetric linear demand system, which is a generalization of Dixit 
(1979) : 
P:¡(Xi, X-i) = a - Xi - ,X-i X-i = E#iXJ" i, j = 1, ... , n (7) 
In fact, these are the demand functions of a representative consumer whose 
utility depends on a vector of consumption goods X = (x p X 2 , •••••• , xn ) and 
the numeraire good m. It is given by W(x) + m4with: 
("') (¿i x; + 2, ¿i~J" XiXJ")W()x = a L..JXi - j=l, .. ,n 
i 2 
where, represents the degree of substitutability between any pair of goods i 
and j. The higher the " the higher is the degree of substitutability between 
i and j. When, tends to zero, each firm virtually becomes a monopolist; 
when , tends to one, all goods are almost perfect substitutes. 
As the following proposition shows, the negotiated wage in these economies 
satisfies the Independence property: 
4Note that this utility function subsumes a preference for variety. It is decreasing in 'Y 
and increasing in the number of product varieties n. 
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Proposition 2: Let there be n identical firms, with linear one factor 
(labor) technology, bargaining with a single union. 1f firms face symmetric 
linear demands, and if the union's objective function is m-separable in wages 
and in employment and is log-linear in employment, then the negotiated wage 
emerging from centralized bargaining is independent of the degree of product 
differentiation", the number of firms, n, and also of whether firms compete 
in prices, or quantitie~. 
In the next subseetion, we first solve for the negotiated wage in a Cournot 
market for a general union objective (2). Then we derive the closed form 
solution for a more speeifie union objeetive to illustrate our main resulto 
3.1 Cournot Competition: 
Let us derive a firm's equilibrium output and profits in the Cournot market. 
In the last stage of the game, firm i solves: 
w 
MaX'Xi (a - Xi - ,X-i)Xi - A Xi (8) 
given sorne \\'age level w, and given the rival firms' output ehoiees X-i. 
The first order eondition (foe) are: 
W 
a - 2Xi - ,X-i = A (9) 
Then a firm's output in the symmetrie equilibrium is: 
a- ~ 
x*(w) - A (10)
- 2+,(n-l) 
5Note that the type of market competition can be viewed as a market parameter, Q, 
according to the Conjectural Variations approach (Bowley (1924)). In Cournot Competi­
tion a firm i perceives its rivals' outputs to be unaffected by changes in its own output. In 
Bertrand Competition, firm i conjectures that, in response to a change in its own output, 
its rivals will adjust their outputs in a compensatory way to leave their market prices 
unchanged. In general, these conjectures can be represented by a linear expectation func­
tion: t:..xj == Qt:..Xi,j i- i,j = 1,oo.,n. Then Q = O corresponds to Cournot Competition, 
and Q == ;_\ corresponds to Bertrand Competition with homogenous goods. The differ­
entiated Bertrand case, as well as the collusive (joint profit maximization) case can be 
accomodated by choosing appropriate values of Q. In fact, it can be shown that our results 
hold for a wide spectrum of values of Q. 
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Our linear one factor technology assumption implies that its optimal choice 
of labor is: 
l*(w) = x*(w) (11)A 
Finally, a firm's equilibrium profits are given by: 
*( ) _ [ *( )]2 _ (a - X)2 (12)
'Ir W - x w - (2 + I'(n _ 1))2 
Observe that both, the optimal output and "indirect" profits, are inversely 
related to the degree of product differentiation, 1', and to the number of firms, 
n6 • This is also true for the price-cost margin (from foc (9)). Note too, that 
the equilibrium output and profits satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1, 
i.e. they are m-separable in wages and the list of parameters K = (r, n). 
Proposition 1 then implies that the negotiated wage is independent of l' and 
n. Further, (6) applied to this case gives: 
2(1 - b) bu'(w) br 
- + - =0 (13)
aA-w u(w) aA-w 
The negotiated wage is the solution of this implicit equation. Therefore, it 
is independent of both, the number of firms and the product differentiation. 
To illustrate, consider u(w) = w - Wo, where Wo may be interpreted as the 
best alternative wage. Then from (13) the negotiated wage is: 
* aAb + [2 + b(r - 2)]wo
w = (14)2+b(r-1) 
Obviously, this wage coincides with the negotiated wage in the homogenous 
n-firm Cournot market. It, also, coincides withthe wage bargain struck be­
tween a monopoly and its union. Note, that the negotiated wage increases 
6As "1 increases, the size of aH markets shrinks due to the representative consumer's 
preference for variety. As n increases, the demand for a firm's good shifts in due to the 
availability of a larger number of substitutes. Further, as "1 increases (or n increases), 
the intensity of competition increases. As a result, a firm's profits decrease with both, 
"1 and n. On the other hand, a firm's output decreases with "1, because the market size 
effect dominates the competition effect. Also, as n increases, the substitutability effect 
dominates the competition effect, leading to lower per firm output. 
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with the size of market a, the efficiency of the technology A, the best alter­
native wage Wo, and the union' s bargaining power b, while it decreases as 
the union cares relatively more about employment. 
3.2 Bertrand Competition: 
We turn next to a Bertrand differentiated market. Let , < 1. Inverting the 
system of inverse demand functions in (7) we obtain the demand system: 
D.(. .) = a(l -,) - [1 + ,(n - 2)]Pi + ,P-i (15)
t Pt,P-t [1 + ,(n - 1)](1 _,) 
for i = 1, 2, ... , n and P-i = í:,ii=iPj
 
Then, given the negotiated wage w and its rivals' prices P-i, firm i solves:
 
The first order condi tions are: 
w 
a(l -,) - [1 + ,(n - 2)]pi + ,P-i = (Pi - A)[l + ,(n - 2)] (16) 
In the symmetric equilibrium, we get: 
* a(l -,) + [1 + ,(n - 2)]~ 
P = (17)2+,(n-3) 
A firm 's output in equilibrium is then: 
x*(w) _ (a - ~)[1 + ,(n - 2)] . (18)
- [1 + ,(n - 1)][2 + ,(n - 3)] 
and its indirect profits are: 
7J"*(W) = (a - ~)2[1 + ,(n - 2)](1 -,) = {x*(w)}2[l + ,(n -1)](1 -,) 
[2 + ,(n - 3)]2[1 + ,(n - 1)] [1 + ,(n - 2)] 
(19) 
Here too, optimal output, indirect profit and price-cost margin are decreasing 
in , and in n (except if n = 2, in which case output initial1y decreases and 
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then increases with ,)7. Moreover, both output and profit functions satisfy 
the separability property of Proposition l. 
Note, that (6) applied to the Bertrand case reduces to the same equation 
as in the Cournot case (see (13)): 
_ 2(1 - b) + bu' (w) _ rb = O 
aA-w u(w) aA-w 
The negotiated wage is again independent of the number of firms n, and the 
degree of product differentiation ,. Moreover, it is the same in both, Cournot 
and Bertrand markets for a general u(w). Thus, it is independent of the type 
of competition. If, in addition, u(w) = w - WQ, the negotiated wage is given, 
as before, by (14). 
O 
3.3 Discussion. 
If we were to use the logic of the quote at the beginning of the introduction, 
we would be lead to expeet that the higher the surplus an industry creates, 
the higher should be the negotiated wage. If rents available in the industry 
are direct1y related to the degree of product differentiation, the degree of 
industry concentration, or the type of competition, why do we get the wage 
independence result? Using the intuition of Section 2, we need to understand 
whye.g. the percentage decrease (due to a wage increase) in a monopolist's 
output and profits is of similar magnitude as those of a single firm in an 
(almost) homogenous Cournot, or Bertrand industry. 
Let us consider the Cournot market first. A wage increase, by increasing 
the marginal cost of all the firms in the industry, has two effects on a specific 
firm's output. A negative direct effect, i.e. the firm decreases its output 
as it is facing now a higher marginal costo And a positive strategic effect, 
i.e. the firm increases its output in response to its rival firms' decreasing 
their outputs. The strategic effect is stronger, hence the (negative) overall 
effect is weaker, the higher is n,or the higher is , (since competition becomes 
stronger). As we have seen, in these cases a firm' s output is lower, too. 
Thus, a firm's percentage decrease in output remains invariant to , and n. 
7Similar arguments hold as in the Cournot case. See previous footnote. If, however, 
n = 2, as 'Y decreases, the competition effect dominates at first and then the preference 
for variety effect, thus producing the inverted. bell shaped output curve. 
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A similar property can be shown to hold for a firm's indirect profits. 
When , is close to zero, (i.e. the local monopoly case), the size of the 
strategic effect is negligible. Thus, an increase in w causes a relatively large 
decrease in the local monopolist 's profits. While when , is close to one, 
the strategic effect is strong enough to partially offset the direct effect, thus 
resulting to a smaller decrease in profits. Note, that the local monopolist's 
profits are higher compared to a firm's in an almost homogeneous industry. 
Thus, the percentage decrease in profits due to a wage increase does not 
vary with the degree of product differentiation. A similar explanation goes 
through for n as well, since n = 1 corresponds to the monopoly case and a 
sufficient1y large n replicates an almost perfectly competitive industry. 
Let us next consider the Bertrand industry. As previously, a wage increase 
has two effects on a firm's output. The negative direct effect results from an 
increase in a firm's price, and thus a decrease in its output, due to its higher 
marginal costo The positive strategic effect stems from the firm increasing 
its output as a response to an increase in its rivals' prices. Here too, the size 
of the strategic effect is smaller, the softer is the competition, that is, the 
lower is " or the smaller is n. Contrary to the Cournot case, however, the 
direct effect on output is increasing in , . For n > 2, the strategic effect is 
sufficiently strong to imply, as before, that the decrease in output is larger 
for values of the parameters where the output produced per firm is larger.8 
Hence, the observed invariance of the percentage decrease in output (as the 
wage increases) with the degree of product differentiation and the number of 
firms. Finally, invariance of the percentage decrease in profits with , and n 
follows from a reasoning similar to the Cournot case. 
It remains to explain why, for fixed values of , and n, the percentage 
decrease in output and profits, as the wage increases, is the same under 
Cournot and Bertrand competition . For, close to zero, the firm is a local 
monopolist, thus the type of competition has little effect on output, profits 
or variations in these variables due to changes in wage. For the remáining 
cases, first observe that a firm's profits under Cournot are higher than under 
Bertrand, while the opposite is true for its output. Both, the direct and the 
8Thís is also true for n = 2, but only for low values of 'Y. For high values of 'Y, the direct 
effect offsets the (relatively weak) strategic effect, resulting to an inverted bell shaped 
output variation as 'Y increases. The output, too, behaves the same way (see footnote 7), 
thus resulting to the invariance of the percentage changes in output with respect to 'Y for 
n=2. 
11 
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strategic, effects of a wage increase on output, are stronger in the Bertrand 
case. To see why the direct effect is stronger, consider the case of almost 
perfectly substitutable goods. Even a small increase in a Bertrand firm' s 
marginal cost causes it to lose all its market share, while a Cournot firm loses 
only a small part of it. A Bertrand industry being more competitive than 
a Cournot industry, the strategic effect is obviously stronger in the former. 
It turns out, in addition, that the total effect on output is also stronger 
under Bertrand, thus explaining the invariance of the percentage decrease in 
output to the type of competition. Finally, the invariance of the percentage 
decrease in profits to the type of competition can be illustrated in the case of 
almost perfect substitutes. While a Bertrand firm's price-cost margin hardly 
changes as a result of an increase in wage, that of a Cournot firm decreases 
substantially. Thus, the resulting decrease in profits is much larger for a 
Cournot firmo 
Note, that our independence result has important implications for em­
ployment policy. We have seen that an increase in " or n, leads to a decrease 
in per firm output. At the industry level, however, we find that they have 
different impacts. A higher degree of substitutability among goods leads to 
lower industry output, and thus to lower aggregate employment. While an 
increase in the number of firms (or product varieties) leads to higher industry 
output, and employment. Any change of these parameters is absorbed solely 
by aggregate employment variations, since the negotiated wage remains con­
stant. Thus, unions do better in a less concentrated market, but not in 
a market where products are better substitutes. Finally, unions welfare is 
higher in a Bertrand industry than in a Cournot, since in both the wages are 
equal, while aggregate employment is higher in the Bertrand market. 
Different Union Objectives & the Necessity 
of our assumption: 
In this section we show that most of union objective functions used in the 
literature fit in our specification (2). First, the union objective coincides with 
the welfare of its median member (Booth (1984), Grossman (1983)). Let v(w) 
be the median member' s utility from the wage w. Let v(wo) be his utility 
from a reference wage wo. This can be interpreted as the unemployment 
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benefits or an alternative wage from sorne inferior jobo Let M be the number 
of union members. Then the median member expects to find a job with 
probability f:t. Thus, his expected utility is: 
L L 
MV(w)	 + (1 - M)v(wo) (20) 
The union objective is then to maximize its median member's utility aboye 
the reference utility, i.e. 
L 
U(w, L) = M(v(w) - v(wo)) 
Let u(w) = [v(w) - v(wo)JlM. Then it is a special case of (2). 
Second, the union maximizes its members' total excess utility. If aH 
members are identical and each has a utility of wage v(w), and v(wo) for the 
best alternative wage, we get the utilitarian union objective function (Oswald 
(1982)) with identical workers. That is, 
U(L, w) = L[v(w) - v(wo)]	 (21) 
which again is a special case of (2). 
FinaHy, consider a general form of the union objective function that has 
been used in the empirical work (Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981), Pencavel 
(1984)). This is a modified version of a Stone Geary Utility function : 
(22) 
If the union's minimum acceptable employrnent, Lo, is normalized to zero, 
and m ::; 1 this objective function also fits our specification (2). 
4.1	 An Example to show the necessity of our assump­
tion: 
"Ve saw that the wage independency property holds only if the union's ob­
jective is of the type specified in (2). To get sorne insight on the role of 
the union's objective for the wage invariance to the market parameters, we 
consider a case where the assumption (2) is not satisfied. Let: 
L 
U(w,L) = w(l + 2') 
13 
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Assume a Bertrand differentiated goods industry. Then the negotiated wage 
solves: 
where x*(w) is given in (18). This is equivalent to maximizing: 
nx*(w)(1 - b)[2Inx*(w) + In X(r, n)] + b[ln w + In{l + 2A }] 
) - [1+'Y(n-l)](l-'Y) L t Y( ) - 1+'Y(n-2)h X("n - 1+'Y(n-2) • ewere "n - [1+'Y(n-l)][2+'Y(n-3)]' 
Then the first order conditlOn is: 
_ 2(1 - b) + ~ = b (23) 
aA - w w 2A2 /nY(r, n) + (aA - w) 
The LHS of (23) is decreasing, while the RHS is increasing, in w. Further, 
the LHS is independent of, while the RHS shifts with, , and n. Hence, 
the negotiate wage depends on both, the product substitutability " and the 
number of firms n. Finally, it can be easily checked that the negotiated wage 
depends on the type of competition, too. 
A proposed Solution: 
The Nash Bargaining solution cannot be used to derive the negotiated wage in 
the case of centralized bargaining in a homogeneous Bertrand industry. The 
firms' profits are always zero, regardless of the wage rate, so that the Nash 
product is not well defined. Motivated by the wage independence property, 
we propose that the negotiated wage in a homogeneous Bertrand industry 
should be the limit of the solution of a differentiated Bertrand market as the 
parameter of differentiation, " goes to 1. Indeed, in the class of industries 
studied in section 3 (i.e. symmetric linear demand-linear one factor tech­
nology industries) and under various union objectives, we have found that 
the negotiated wage is independent of the parameter of differentiation, " 
for all , < 1 in the Bertrand case. It is then reasonable to think that the 
negotiated wage in the homogenous market (, = 1) coincides with that of 
any other differentiated Bertrand market. 
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Using the example of the previous section, we now illustrate our proposed 
solution. As we saw, the negotiated wage depends on the degree of product 
differentiation l' From equation (23), and for n = 2 we get, 
_ 2(1 - b) + ~ = b (24) 
aA - w w A2 (1 +1) (2 - ,) + (aA - w) 
The solution of (24), w*(r), is continuous in l' Hence we can take the limit of 
w* (,) as I ~ 1, to derive the negotiated wage in the homogenous Bertrand 
market. 
6 Conclusion: 
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions under which the wage emerging 
from centralized bargaining between a union and the firms in an industry is 
independent of a number of market parameters. Indeed, we show that in an 
oligopolistic product market where identical firms face symmetric linear de­
mands for their differentiated goods, and are endowed with linear one-factor 
(labor) technologies, the negotiated wage is independent of the industry con­
centration, the degree of product differentiation, and the type of market 
competition. Moreover, this wage independence property is robust under a 
broad class of union objectives. 
This result has sorne interesting implications for employment policy. We 
show that changes in market parameters that affect the level of competition 
among firms have beneficial effects on industry employment. In particular, 
it is possible to increase employment by encouraging the entry of new firms, 
e.g. through deregulation of the industry, or even subsidizing entry costs. 
A number of testable hypotheses can emerge from our theoretical results. 
First, is the wage independence property. The latter is supported by Hirsch 
& Connoly (1987), and Hirsch (1990) who find no evidence that union rent 
seeking is more effective in highly concentrated industries, or among firms 
with large market shares. The independence property further suggests that 
union/non-union differentials are independent of market parameters (such 
as substitutability among goods, industry concentration, and the intensity 
of competition), if non-union wage is to be taken as the best alternative 
wage. So far, evidence is mixed on the issue. According to Lewis (1986), 
union wage premiums are typical1y smaller in highly concentrated industries. 
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However, Steward (1990) concludes that wage differentials are positive in 
industries with market power, but zero in perfectly competitive markets. 
Second, the union effect on profits is more deleterious among firms with low 
market shares. This is in accordance with Clark (1984). Third, the union 
effect on price-cost margin is less negative in highly concentrated industries. 
This is along the lines of Domowitz et al. (1986) who find little evidence 
that price-cost margins are more negative in highly concentrated industries. 
Final1y, there is no link between wages and profits. This is in contrast to 
Pugel (1980), and Carruth & Oswald (1989) who detect sorne link between 
wage and profits. 
It is known that the negotiated wage in a Bertrand homogenous market 
with identical firms and constant marginal costs is indeterminate, profits for 
the firms being O for any wage rateo We propose that a reasonable way 
to solve this indeterminacy is that the negotiated wage of the homogenous 
market be the limit of the wage of a differentiated market as the degree of 
substitutability goes to one. The independence property discussed aboye 
then implies that the negotiated wage in the homogenous Bertrand market 
coincides with that of the differentiated market, if the firms, in addition, face 
linear symmetric demands. 
The Dixit-Stiglitz (DS,1977) monopolistic competition model has been 
used extensively in the literature (Macroeconomics, International Trade and 
Growth) to capture the effects of imperfectly competitive markets. While 
this model performs well when the number of firms in the industry is large 
(e.g. when entry costs are low and goods are poor substitutes), it does not 
capture the strategic effects in a concentrated industry. Indeed it ignores 
the price index effect of individual pricing decisions. The Yang and Heijdra 
(1993) variant solves this problem, but loses much of the simplicity of the 
original solution. (Note, however, that this need not happen in a general 
equilibrium model if income effect is taken into account (d' Aspremont et 
al. (1994) )). In contrast, the symmetric linear demands-one factor (labor) 
technology oligopolistic product market model takes into account all strategic 
effects. Moreover, if the wage bargaining is centralized this model retains the 
simplicity of the DS model. We suggest, therefore, that it can be a reasonable 
alternative to the DS model. 
\Ve have provided in this paper sufficient conditions for the independence 
property to hold in the context of linear one-factor technology, and iden­
tical firms. What alternative specifications of demand systems give rise to 
16 
multiplicatively-separable output and "indirect" profit functions? Does the 
negotiated wage remain rather independent of the market parameters if the 
technology is non-linear (e.g. Cobb-Douglas), or firms are not identical? 
These questions remain open for further research. 
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